Pacifist Japan shifts from exclusive self‑defense toward a military buildup

Japan is moving from its postwar pacifist posture toward a larger military: doubling arms spending, pursuing strike‑back capabilities and easing export limits amid rising tensions with China and U.S. alliance pressure.

Japan is accelerating a long‑running shift away from strict postwar self‑defense toward a broader and more capable military posture. The government plans to double annual arms spending, pursue long‑range strike and unmanned systems, relax remaining arms export limits and deepen defence cooperation with partners as it cites growing threats from China and closer coordination with the United States. Constitutional and legal shifts Japan’s post‑war pacifist identity rests on Article 9 of the 1947 constitution, which renounced the use of force to settle international disputes. Over decades Tokyo has interpreted that provision to allow the Self‑Defense Forces and limited overseas missions. Major legal turns include a 2014 reinterpretation under Shinzo Abe to permit collective self‑defense and a 2015 security law that allows the use of force in some cases to aid allies. Critics and some legal experts view the newer policies — and statements by current leaders — as hollowing out Article 9. Security strategy and capabilities Since December 2022, official strategy documents have called for strike‑back capabilities with long‑range missiles and a more offensive role for Japanese forces, explicitly naming China as a principal strategic challenge. The new budget approved by the Cabinet exceeds 9 trillion yen (about $58 billion) for the coming year and aims to strengthen coastal defence, cruise missiles and unmanned arsenals. Japan has signalled it will reach a 2% of GDP defence spending target earlier than planned. Tensions with China and regional incidents Tokyo describes heightened Chinese activity near Japanese territory — including radar‑locking of Japanese aircraft during Chinese carrier drills and the appearance of Chinese carriers near Iwo Jima — as part of the rationale for a stronger deterrent. Beijing has criticised Tokyo’s acceleration of military buildup and cited concerns about a move away from peaceful development. Historical sensitivities — such as visits to or associations with Yasukuni Shrine — continue to affect perceptions in China and the Koreas. Defence industry and deterrence posture Tokyo is moving to promote its defence industry: easing arms export restrictions, collaborating on next‑generation fighters with the UK and Italy, and finalising a frigate sale to Australia. A government panel has suggested considering a nuclear‑powered submarine for longer‑range deterrence, and some officials have publicly discussed nuclear options; at the same time the government reiterates adherence to the three non‑nuclear principles while requesting extended deterrence assurances from the United States. Final summary and suggestions Given long‑standing legal, historical and regional sensitivities, continued public debate and transparent discussion of policy, budgets and legal bases may help clarify Japan’s aims and limits. Officials could consider increased parliamentary debate, clearer communication with neighboring countries, and continued reliance on alliances and multilateral channels to reduce misperception while pursuing defensive capabilities.